data used. The pro-globalization side has tended to prefer "hard" quantitative data while the other side has drawn more eclectically on various types of evidence, both systematic and anecdotal or subjective. Differences in the data used no doubt account in part for the differing positions taken. However, since both sides have had access to essentially the same data, it does not seem plausible that such large and persistent differences in the claims made about what is happening to inequality in the world stem entirely from one side's ignorance of the facts.
One reason why such different views persist is that it is difficult to separate out the effects of globalization from the many other factors impinging on how the distribution of income is evolving in the world. The processes of global economic integration are so pervasive that it is hard to say what the world would be like without them. These difficulties of attribution provide ample fuel for debate, though they also leave one suspicious of the confident claims made by both sides.
Conflicting assessments can also stem from hidden contextual factors. Diverse impacts of the same growth-promoting policies on inequality can be expected given the different initial conditions among countries. Policy reforms shift the distribution of income in different directions in different countries. Yet both sides make generalizations about distributional impacts without specifying the context. In a given national setting, there may well be much less to disagree about. This paper looks into another possible reason for the continuing debate about the facts: the two sides in this debate do not share the same values about what constitutes a just distribution of the gains from globalization. The empirical facts in contention do not stem solely from objective data on incomes, prices, and so on but also depend on value judgments made in measurement-judgments that one may or may not accept. It can hardly be surprising that different people hold different normative views about inequality. And it is well understood in economics that those views affect how one defines and measures inequalityalthough it is ethics, not economics, that determines what trade-offs one accepts between the welfare of different people. A class of "ethical measures" of inequality is built on this realization. 4 What is more notable in the present context is that important differences in values have become embedded in the methodological details underlying statements about what is happening to inequality in the world. These differences are rarely brought to the surface and argued out properly in this debate.
This discussion points out three key differences in the value judgments made about distributive justice that underlie the globalization debate. The first concerns one of the favorite empirical claims of the critics of globalization, namely that inequality between countries has been rising during the period of globalizationsuggesting that the gains have been unfairly distributed. The pro-globalization side disputes this, arguing instead that inequality between countries has been falling over the last twenty years or so. The value judgment here relates to whether one should weight countries equally or people equally when assessing distributional outcomes.
The second difference in concepts of inequality relates to how much weight one should attach to the way average gains from reform vary with income versus the differences in impacts found at a given level of income. The pro-globalization side has tended to focus on aggregate measures of inequality or poverty, while the antiglobalization side has pointed to the losers among the poor and those vulnerable to poverty-often, it seems, to the point of ignoring the aggregate outcomes. A value judgment underlying this difference in perspective relates to the weight one attaches to horizontal versus vertical inequality when assessing the distributional impacts of globalization.
The third issue concerns another distinction between two concepts of inequality: relative inequality, which depends solely on proportionate differences in incomes, versus absolute inequality, which depends on the absolute differencesthe "income gap between rich and poor." Virtually all the research by economists on world inequality has used the former concept, which has then become embedded in more popular writings supporting globalization. By contrast, critics of globalization appear often to be more concerned with absolute inequality. Here again we will see that the difference in concepts of inequality carries weight for the position one takes in the globalization debate.
Some Stylized "Facts"
A common finding in the literature is that changes over time in the extent of income inequality at the country level are uncorrelated with rates of economic growth. In other words, growth is distribution neutral on average.
6 Figure 1 illustrates this lack of correlation found between changes in inequality and growth in average living standards. Each point in the figure represents two household surveys at different dates for the same country, and the figure provides about 120 such "spells" spanning the 1990s. 7 The proportionate change in inequality between the two surveys is plotted against the growth rate in mean household income (or consumption) per person between the same two surveys. Inequality is measured by the usual Gini index. The simple correlation coefficient between changes in the log Gini index and the growth rates shown in Figure 1 is -.06. Among growing economies, inequality rises about half the time and falls half the time. This also holds for growing poor countries. Thus these data confirm other studies suggesting that the Kuznets hypothesis-the proposition that with growth in a low-income country, inequality first increases then starts to fall after a certain point-has generally not been borne out by experience in growing developing countries. 7. This is an updated version of the data set described in Ravallion and Chen (1997) . 8. Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998); Fields (2001) . The observation that changes in inequality tend to be uncorrelated with growth rates has an important implication. Since growth tends to leave income shares unchanged on average, absolute poverty measures (whereby the poverty line has fixed real value) will tend to fall with growth. The same share of a larger pie means of course a higher income. The expected negative correlation between rates of poverty reduction and rates of growth across countries has been borne out by a large body of empirical research using household-level survey data for many countries.
9 Granted, there have been cases in which growth has left the poor behind in absolute terms, but they are the exception rather than the rule.
Is the world becoming more unequal in the current period of globalization? Measuring inequality among people in the world as a whole, different studies and different time periods give different answers to this question. Bourguignon and Morrison find signs of slightly rising inequality from the 1970s to the early 1990s, Sala-i-Martin reports evidence suggesting a tendency for inequality to fall in the 1990s, and Milanovic reports rising inequality in some subperiods and falling inequality in others, with no clear trend.
10
However, even if one takes the view that inequality has been rising, it has clearly not increased enough to choke off the gains to the poor from growth in the world economy. Figure 2 gives estimates of the poverty rate for the developing world over the period . Over this twenty-year period, the percentage of the population of the developing world living on less than $1 a day was almost halved, falling from 40 to 21 percent. The number of poor by this measure fell from 1.5 billion in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001.
Some of these "stylized facts" about what has been happening to poverty and inequality in the world have been questioned. The claims often heard from critics of globalization that the world is becoming more unequal appear to stem in part from the fact that many poor countries have not participated in the growth of the world economy. Indeed, looking back over the last 100 years or so, initially poorer countries have tended to experience lower subsequent growth rates.
11
Poor countries are not catching up with rich ones-indeed, it looks like the opposite has been happening. For example, an often quoted statistic is that the average income of the richest country in the world was about ten times that of the poorest around the end of the nineteenth century but is closer to sixty times higher today. Furthermore, on top of this long-term trend, there have been claims that inequality between countries has increased sharply since about 1980.
12
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9. Evidence on this point can be found in World Bank (1990, chap. 3; 2000, chap. 4); Ravallion (1995 Ravallion ( , 2001 ); Ravallion and Chen (1997); Fields (2001, chap. 5) .
10. Bourguignon and Morrison (2002); Milanovic (2004) . 11. Pritchett (1997 ). 12. Milanovic (2004 . We will return to the issue of how inequality between countries should
Another issue that has sometimes been raised regards the fact that the above discussion relates only to absolute poverty, whereby the poverty line has fixed real value. Measures of relative poverty, in which the poverty line responds positively to the mean, naturally show less impact from growth. Indeed, in the extreme case in which the poverty line is directly proportional to the mean, a growth process that raises all incomes by an equal proportion will leave measured poverty unchanged. One can question whether such a poverty measure makes any sense: although relative deprivation may matter to welfare, it surely cannot be argued that absolute levels of living are irrelevant. When one compares poverty lines across countries with their average consumption levels, one finds higher poverty lines in richer countries, though the relationship tends to be quite inelastic among poor countries, consistent with the view that absolute deprivation dominates.
13 However, as developing countries grow, the idea of what 6
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be measured. 13. Ravallion (1994, p. 41) . Developing world as a whole
Excluding China
Percent b
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2004b) . a. The figure gives the percentage of the population of low-and middle-income countries estimated to live in households with consumption or income per person less than $32.74 a month at 1993 purchasing power parity.
b. Percent of population of the developing world living on less than $1 a day.
"poverty" means will undoubtedly evolve, too. Then a sole focus on absolute poverty will overstate the importance of growth to poverty reduction in the longer term.
As support for the view that globalization is good for poverty reduction, the pro-globalization side of the debate has often pointed to the developing world's overall success against absolute poverty since the early 1980s. It is argued that pro-globalization policies in developing countries are pro-poor because they generate higher economic growth, which does not come with higher inequality and so reduces absolute poverty.
14 However, a closer inspection of the aggregate poverty numbers, such as in figure 2 , immediately raises some doubts about the role played by globalization versus other factors. China is hugely important in the world's overall success against extreme poverty; indeed, the total number of poor in the world (by the $1-a-day standard) excluding China has remained quite stable over this period, at around 850 million. 15 As is clear from figure 2 , there was a dramatic decline in China's poverty incidence in the early 1980s; about 200 million people crossed the $1-a-day threshold between 1981 and 1984. Note, however, that this largely preceded the country's external trade reforms. 16 More plausibly, the sharp drop in poverty in China in the early 1980s was due to another kind of reform: the de-collectivization of agriculture after Premier Deng's reforms starting in 1978.
17
Furthermore, while the evidence is compelling that growth tends to reduce absolute poverty, that does not imply that every policy that is good for growth will also reduce poverty. Specific growth-promoting policies in specific country contexts can have impacts on distribution that belie such generalizations. For example, Lundberg and Squire find evidence that trade openness tends to increase inequality. 18 There is also some evidence of an interaction effect with mean income, such that trade openness tends to be associated with higher inequality in poor countries but lower inequality in high-income countries.
19
The aforementioned issues have received attention in the literature, although all of them are sufficiently important and sufficiently contentious to merit further research. The rest of this paper examines some issues that have received far less attention, related to what we mean by "inequality." It will be argued that differences between competing concepts of inequality influence the way empirical evidence is interpreted and hence the position one takes in the globalization debate.
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Divergence versus Between-Country Inequality
Critics of globalization have pointed to data suggesting that inequality between countries has been rising since around 1980. The contribution of globalization per se to this trend is unclear. 20 However, putting the attribution problem to one side, there is another important question about how inequality should be measured. The measures most widely quoted by the critics of globalization treat each country as one observation. The implicit value judgment here is that countries, not people, should get equal weight in assessing the fairness of the division of gains from globalization. An alternative approach is to give people equal weight. Estimates of the decomposition of world inequality into between-country and within-country components have typically used population weights.
21 By this alternative concept, all individuals at a given real income level get equal weight in assessing between-country inequality, no matter where they live. A person in China does not count less than a person in Chad at the same real income.
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Brookings Trade Forum: 2004 20. For further discussion, see Williamson (1998) and O'Rourke (2002) . 21. See, for example, Schultz (1998) , Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), and . For an overview of the theory of inequality decomposition, see Cowell (2000) . 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Weighting countries equally Weighting people equally Source: Milanovic (2004) .
The choice between these concepts of inequality matters greatly to the message conveyed on how fairly the benefits of aggregate growth are being shared. If instead of weighting countries equally one uses population weights, then the tendency for rising inequality between countries vanishes.
22 Indeed, with population weighting, there is evidence of a trend decline in the between-country component of inequality since roughly the mid-1970s. In marked contrast to the series in which countries are weighted equally, the population-weighted series in figure 3 suggests that inequality between countries is now the lowest it has been in half a century. The two weighting schemes deliver dramatically different messages.
What arguments can be made for choosing between the two series in figure 3 ? Some economists have seen this as a purely technical matter of what is "right" and "wrong." For example, Sala-i-Martin has argued that weighting countries equally is a "mistake that delivers a very misleading picture and one is led to conclude (wrongly) that there has been 'divergence big time '." 23 However, intelligent people can disagree about whether countries or people should be weighted equally. Consider the inequality between two equal-sized groups, A and B, in which each person in group A has an income of $1 a day while each person in B has an income of $10. (So we abstract from intragroup inequality.) Now imagine instead that group B is only one tenth the size of A. Is your assessment of the extent of inequality between A and B any different with this change? No doubt some readers will say "no" on the grounds that either way a typical person in group A has only one tenth of the income as one in B. Others will say "yes," on the grounds that with fewer people in group B, one's concern about the extent of intergroup inequality is diminished.
When assessing how rich countries are doing relative to poor countries, it is natural to take the country as the unit of observation. Knowing that the income per capita of a rich country is thirty times greater (even at purchasing power parity) than a poor country has a salience for our comprehension of the extent of the disparities in the world. The practice of weighting countries equally is almost universally followed in the large macroeconomic literature on growth and distributional empirics. Weighting countries equally is a close cousin of the method used to measure "sigma convergence" in the literature on growth empirics. The rise in between-country inequality over the last twenty years that is evident in figure 3 when countries are weighted equally is indicative of what is called in the growth literature (unconditional) divergence. Weighting countries equally makes sense in a regression that is being used to test theories about the causes of cross-country differences in growth rates. In that case, each country can be thought of as a draw from the universe of all the combinations of country policies, shocks, initial conditions, and outcomes.
It has been argued that countries are the relevant unit of observation for comparing policies and for drawing conclusions about what policies work best for reducing inequality between countries. Milanovic makes this argument in favor of weighting countries equally. 24 This view is more defensible for certain economy-wide policies than others, such as social sector policies, which are often developed and implemented at subnational (even local) levels. However, for the sake of argument, let us agree that policies are implemented at country level. Is this a compelling argument for weighting countries equally when assessing global inequality? It is the impacts of those policies on people that we care about. The lack of policy reform and growth in a small country surely cannot be deemed to cancel out the policy reforms that helped generate so much economic growth in China over the last twenty years or so. Yet that is what inequality measures that weight countries equally do. While it can be agreed that for purely descriptive purposes, and for testing the implications of certain growth models, one may not care about the population shares of countries when assessing inequality between them, weighting people unequally in such a seemingly arbitrary way can be questioned when-as is plainly the case in the globalization debate-one is attaching normative significance to measures of between-country inequality.
The practice of weighting countries equally when measuring inequality between countries also implies troubling inconsistencies in methodology. It is not clear why one would be happy to use population weights when measuring inequality within countries but not between them. Indeed, one would probably never question the need to weight by household size (or the number of adult equivalents) when calculating an inequality measure from a sample survey for a given country, and the same logic surely applies to the between-country component of total inequality. Weighting countries equally rather than people is also inconsistent with the way one would normally calculate the global mean income. A measure of inequality is a summary statistic of the information on how income is found to vary with the quantile (such as percentile) of the population ranked by income. One would probably not even think of using the unweighted overall mean income, so why would one use unweighted means at given percentiles of the distribution when measuring inequality?
Another defense of weighting countries equally starts by rejecting the implicit assumption in population weighting that individual welfare depends on "own income," and allowing instead the possibility that welfare also depends on country of residence. Population weights can be questioned in all circumstances in which group membership has individual welfare significance independent of income. This can happen in a variety of ways. For example, the local political jurisdiction of residence can matter to one's access to local public goods. Group membership can also matter to one's ability to insure against income risk or to smooth consumption. Social norms of behavior or "culture" are also formed in groups and can influence welfare in important ways. 25 There are ample precedents for attaching significance to geographic identity in public policy. The constitutions of a number of federations (including Australia and the United States) give states political representation in the upper houses of parliament, independently of their population sizes. Those living in smaller states thus get higher weight. Similarly, it is "one country, one vote" at the United Nations and many other international organizations.
What is not clear in the present context is how persuasive such arguments are for weighting countries equally rather than people. Yes, one can allow that country identity matters. However, it would seem hard to imagine that this type of argument would justify weighting countries equally. That surely goes too far in the other direction. Some sort of hybrid weighting scheme may be called for, derived from an explicit assumption on the weight one attaches to country identity in assessing individual welfare. Suppose that the role of "country identity" can be captured by including a country-specific multiplicative factor in the underlying function of own income that one uses to assess individual welfare in a given country. Then the appropriate weights will be products of population weights and these country-specific factors. It would seem extremely unlikely that the appropriate country factors would be the inverse population shares.
A further issue concerns the robustness of the population-weighted inequality series shown in figure 3. China and India (the two most populous countries by far) naturally play an important role in the striking difference between the two series in figure 3 . The high rates of growth in China and (more recently) India since the mid-1980s have been a major inequality-reducing force between people in the world. Take these countries out of the population-weighted series, and the decline in between-country inequality over the last two decades or so largely vanishes; the result is particularly sensitive to just one country, China.
26 By the same token, assessments of how (population-weighted) inequality is changing between countries can be quite sensitive to errors in measuring growth in China and India. For example, there are reasons to suspect biases in the official estimates of China's rate of growth, stemming in part from deficiencies in the underlying administrative data sources, particularly at the local level. (The practice of setting growth rate targets for local governments has not helped!) China's National Bureau of Statistics has gone a long way toward correcting these problems, but it still appears likely that the long-term growth rate in national income per capita has been overestimated by 1 to 2 percentage points. 27 The rate of decline in inequality evident in figure 3 when people are weighted equally is almost certainly overstated.
The sensitivity of the population-weighted series to inclusion of the most populous countries is clearly not a good reason for weighting countries equally. Still, that sensitivity does speak to the need for statistical caution in inferring from the population-weighted series in figure 3 that inequality is falling between countries. How confident can one be in claiming that inequality is falling when that no longer holds if one eliminates just one country?
As demonstrated by the examples above, the implicit values in empirical work matter greatly to the conclusions drawn about the distributive justice of current globalization processes. And arguments can be made both ways.
Vertical versus Horizontal Inequalities
The empirical question at stake in the globalization debate is often posed in terms of how mean gains from reforms vary by prereform income. Do the mean proportionate gains rise or fall as income increases? Studies deemed to be favorable to the supporters of globalization are those that find that the mean proportionate gains are just as high for the poor as for the nonpoor.
28
This perspective emphasizes what can be termed the vertical impacts of reform, that is, the differences in mean impacts between people at different income levels. Critics of globalization, by contrast, appear often to be more concerned about what we can call the horizontal impacts, such as when they point to the fact that there are losers among the poor, even when the net gains to the poor as a whole are positive. Borrowing from the literature on inequality and taxation, we can define the horizontal impacts as the differences in impact among people who are equal ex ante in terms of welfare; such impacts indicate horizontal inequality in the reform. 28. See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2002) . 29. For further elaboration of the various concepts of horizontal inequality found in the literature, see Jenkins and Lambert (1999) .
A conventional poverty or inequality measure implicitly attaches weight to both horizontal and vertical inequality. To see how, imagine that each person receives an income gain from the reform (which could be positive, negative, or zero). Then calculate a prereform poverty and inequality measure (based on the distribution of incomes excluding these gains) and a postreform measure (including the gains). The difference between the two reveals the overall impact of the reform. One can then decompose the impact of a policy reform into vertical and horizontal components, as follows. Define the conditional mean gain as the mean of these gains at a given level of income. Imagine replacing each person's actual gain by the conditional mean corresponding to that person's income and calculating the impact on the poverty or inequality measure with this new synthetic distribution. This can be interpreted as the vertical component of the change in inequality or poverty. If there are no differences in the impacts by levels of income, then the vertical component is zero. However, when some people among those at approximately the same initial income level incur a net loss from reform while others enjoy a gain, this will add to inequality. To isolate this horizontal component, replace each person's actual gain by the deviation between that gain and the conditional mean, and again recalculate the summary statistic on this synthetic distribution. If the impact is predicted perfectly by prereform income, then this horizontal component is zero. 30 Ravallion and Lokshin derive such a decomposition for the impacts of trade reform on inequality and give an empirical example for a specific trade reform.
31
The issue then is not whether horizontal inequality is reflected in current aggregate measures but whether it is adequately reflected. Observers can reasonably object to the horizontal inequalities of globalizing reforms-quite independent of the impacts that those reforms have on conventional inequality or poverty measures. One possible reason is that the initial distribution of income (as measured in practice) need not be horizontally equitable. This can stem from the inadequacies of income as a welfare indicator. There are conceptual and practical problems in measuring household income or consumption, and in making cost-of-living comparisons when prices and household characteristics vary (including the choice of equivalence scales for dealing with differences in family size and demographics). 32 Nor are standard measures (such as household
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30. Note that the vertical and horizontal components need not add up exactly to the total change in measured poverty or inequality. A special case in which the decomposition is exact for proportionate gains (normalized by prereform income) is for the mean log deviation measure of inequality. For details, see Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) .
31. Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) . 32. A good overview of the issues and literature on welfare measurement can be found in Slesnick (1998) . On the bearing that measurement choices can have on policy, see Ravallion (1994) . income per person) likely to reflect well the extent of inequality within households or differences in access to nonmarket goods. These concerns point to the importance of introducing supplementary indicators of welfare into distributional assessments. 33 If we think that certain types of households may in fact be poorer than measured incomes suggest, then our attention will naturally be drawn to impacts on those household types, even if they have similar (measured) incomes. Peoples' subjective assessments of economic welfare and the fairness of the outcomes from economic transactions have been found to depend on a variety of factors, including how much effort different people supplied as well as their initial income.
34 Reference-group effects on welfare-whereby the same income can yield different welfare for people in different reference groups, such as different neighborhoods-can also imply a concern for differences in impacts among people at the same ex ante income.
We can also care about horizontal inequalities even when we are happy with how economic welfare is measured. In the economics of public policy, there is precedent for concern over horizontal inequality, notably in the context of income tax changes-though the point would appear to apply with equal force to other types of policy reform. For example, Pigou wrote that horizontal inequality created "a sense of being unfairly treated . . . in itself an evil." 35 Auerbach and Hassett argue that one might want to give greater weight to horizontal inequities in a tax system on the grounds that "large differences [in tax rates] among similar individuals, regardless of their source, might be viewed as intrinsically arbitrary, and therefore more costly to the social fabric."
36
Two recent studies of tax and transfer policies have shown how inequality or poverty measures can be re-defined to give higher weight to horizontal inequality. In the context of measuring the extent of horizontal inequality in a tax reform, Auerbach and Hassett show how an Atkinson index of social welfare can be decomposed into vertical and horizontal components that can differ in their inequality aversion parameters. 37 In a similar vein, Bibi and Duclos allow differential weights on the horizontal versus vertical components of the impacts of targeted transfers on the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty measures.
38
The same ideas from the analysis of taxes and transfers have a bearing on other areas of public policy, including trade and other efficiency-oriented reforms.
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33. Ravallion (1996) . 34. For a survey of experimental evidence relevant to this point, see Konow (2003) . Subjective assessments of economic welfare have also revealed a more complex set of factors than typically postulated by economists (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002) .
35. Pigou (1949, p. 50) . 36. Auerbach and Hassett (2002, p. 1117) . 37. See Atkinson (1970) . 38. Bibi and Duclos (2004); Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) .
In the context of reform, it may seem unfair that people at similar initial incomes are rewarded very differently. Such assessments will probably depend in part on whether people were aware of the risks they were exposed to and could have taken actions to protect themselves. Many of the welfare losses from globalization stem from factors for which the losers are essentially blameless. When the sole employer in a company town is driven out of business, the town's workers and residents can hardly be blamed for the losses they incur.
In the case of trade reform, the household characteristics that are likely to matter most to horizontal welfare impacts are those that influence net trading positions in relevant markets. Whether a household is a net demander or a net supplier of the specific goods and factors whose prices are changed by trade reform will depend on (among other things) its assets (for example, how much land a farm household controls will influence whether it is a net producer or net consumer of food), demographics (since this will naturally influence consumption patterns), and location (which will matter to both production and consumption opportunities). There is no obvious basis for thinking that these are characteristics that stem from choices for which one would fairly ask the households themselves to bear the adverse consequences of reform.
Such horizontal inequities can also interact powerfully with preexisting social tensions-such as those between different ethnic groups that vary in their production and consumption behaviors-thus fueling social conflict, even to the point of violence. Chua describes how social conflict in parts of Africa has emanated from the fact that different tribal groups have (for various, and contested, reasons) fared very differently under market-friendly regimes. 39 To some extent these conflicts can stem from historical vertical inequalities between groups. However, it can be conjectured that a large share of inequality is horizontal, in that ex-ante similar people in different groups fare very differently under the market-oriented reform. There is no reason to suppose that a conventional inequality measure would weight the consequent social conflicts appropriately. Extreme horizontal inequalities raise concerns about social and political stability. The protests from the losers can be loud, even when the aggregate net gains are positive.
Conventional measurement practices may well underweight horizontal inequality. Indeed, the measure will remain exactly the same if all the incomes in a society are simply reordered; this property is variously called the anonymity axiom or the symmetry axiom in the theory of poverty and inequality measurement. Thus if a policy change results in one person losing and another gaining, such that they swap places in the distribution, this will not have had any impact whatsoever on standard measures. Yet this kind of churning in the distribution is unlikely to go unnoticed by the people involved. One should not be surprised if the losers in the process are unhappy about the outcome and that this fuels criticisms of the policies that led to it.
If it is agreed that these largely theoretical arguments suggest that the horizontal inequities of reform merit greater attention, the next question is whether horizontal inequalities are likely to be quantitatively important in the welfare outcomes of specific growth-promoting policy reforms, including trade reforms. Development experience has shown that many of the things that promote growth can have both winners and losers among the poor-and for other income groups, too. This arises from the heterogeneity in economic circumstances, such as differences in net trading positions in relevant markets for goods and factors. For example, some of the poor are net suppliers of food while others are net demanders, which means that changes in the relative price of food associated with trade reform benefit some but hurt others, with these diverse impacts found both vertically and horizontally in the distribution of income. 40 There can be heterogeneity in other dimensions of welfare at given incomes, such as in access to publicly provided goods and services. Greater openness to external trade often increases the demand for skills that can be quite inequitably distributed in poor countries. Whether the poor gain relatively more than the nonpoor from trade openness will depend crucially on antecedent inequalities in other dimensions, notably human capital.
Two examples illustrate the heterogeneity in impacts of trade reform. The first example relates to China's recent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). To provide a detailed picture of the welfare impacts of this trade reform, Chen and Ravallion use China's national rural and urban household surveys to measure and explain the welfare impacts of goods and factor price changes attributed to accession to the WTO. The price changes were estimated using a general equilibrium model to capture both direct and indirect effects of the initial tariff changes. The welfare impacts were estimated as first-order approximations of a money metric of utility, based on a household model incorporating own-production activities, calibrated to the household-level data imposing minimum aggregation. In the aggregate, Chen and Ravallion find a positive impact of WTO accession on mean household income but virtually no change in aggregate inequality and slightly lower aggregate poverty in the short term as a result of the reform.
41 (The estimated impact on the Gini index, for example, was so small as to be almost undetectable.) However, there is still a sizable and at least partly explicable variance in impacts across household characteristics at a given income. Rural families tend to lose; urban households tend to gain. And there are larger impacts in some parts of the country than others. For example, one finds non-negligible welfare losses among agricultural households in the northeasta region in which rural households are more dependent on feed grain production (for which falling relative prices are expected from WTO accession) than elsewhere in China. Vertical differences in preintervention incomes accounted for virtually none of the measured welfare impacts of this trade reform. The second example comes from research on the likely impacts of agricultural trade reform in Morocco. Here the simulated trade reform entailed the deprotection of cereal producers through substantial reductions in tariffs on imported cereals. As in the China study, the price changes were estimated using a general equilibrium model, and the welfare impacts were estimated as first-order approximations of a money metric of utility using a household survey. 42 In this case, the results suggested that the trade reform would increase overall consumption inequality in Morocco. However, this was entirely due to the reform's impact on horizontal inequality; indeed, the vertical component-the contribution of the inequality in gains conditional on income-was inequality reducing. And, as in China, the horizontal welfare impacts are correlated with household demographics and location.
Simply averaging over such horizontal inequalities can miss a great deal of what matters to the debate on globalization, including social protection policies. Credible assessments of the likely welfare impacts (both horizontally and vertically) can clearly have implications for social protection-though it is probably little more than wishful thinking to imagine that full compensation is feasible, given the informational and incentive constraints on targeted policies. 43 It is important for policy discussions to recognize that diverse welfare impacts can underlie averaged impact calculations. 44 In this light, claims about the distributional impacts of trade or other reforms that use cross-country regressions are of questionable relevance for determining policy in any specific country; such regressions can readily hide the heterogeneity in impacts within countries as well as between them. 45 42. Details can be found in Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) . 43. For a fuller discussion of this point, see van de Walle (1998) . 44. Kanbur (2001) provides a nice illustration of this point in the context of assessments of Ghana's performance in reducing absolute poverty.
45. For further discussion of the concerns about cross-country regressions in this context, see Ravallion (2001) .
Horizontal inequality is a long-established concept in the literature on inequality measurement, although it has received less attention than vertical inequality in theoretical work. 46 Measures of horizontal inequality have typically been applied to studying tax reforms, but they can be adapted to a wider range of reforms and economic changes. (In the present context, the relevant horizontal inequalities are not confined to horizontal impacts that can be measured in monetary units.) Like absolute inequality, horizontal inequality has thus far taken a back seat in studies by economists related to inequality and globalization.
None of this denies the importance of knowing the implications for aggregate poverty and inequality. That is surely the first-order issue in this context. Even when horizontal inequity is a concern, one would presumably want to balance it against other policy objectives, such as reducing absolute poverty. If one follows the critics of globalization who focus solely on the losers among the poor, then one risks undermining the prospects for important poverty-reducing policy changes. At the same time, it must be recognized that undervaluing or even ignoring the horizontal heterogeneity in impacts can generate a seriously incomplete picture and an unnecessarily narrow basis for policy.
Relative versus Absolute Inequality
Thus far the focus has been solely on what is known as relative inequality in the literature on inequality measurement. Relative inequality depends on the ratios of individual incomes to the mean. This property stems from the scale independence axiom in inequality measurement, whereby multiplying all incomes by a constant is deemed to leave inequality unchanged. The stylized fact that growth or greater openness in developing countries tends not to be systematically associated with rising (or falling) inequality rests on this specific concept of inequality. However, it appears that many people do not think about inequality in relative terms. Careful surveys of university students asked which of two income distributions was more unequal; the answers suggest that about half of the students did not accept the scale independence axiom. 47 An alternative concept, suggested by Kolm, is absolute inequality, which depends on the absolute rather than relative differences in levels of living.
48 A measure of absolute inequality is unchanged if all incomes increase by the same amount. Consider an economy with just two households with incomes: $1,000 18
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46. For an overview of the theory and references, see Jenkins and Lambert (1999) . 47. Amiel and Cowell (1999, chap. 4) . 48. Kolm (1976) . There are also intermediate measures, which contain the concepts of absolute and relative inequality as extreme cases; see, for example, Bossert and Pfingsten (1990) . and $10,000. If both incomes double in size, then relative inequality will remain the same: the richer household is still ten times richer. But the absolute difference in their incomes has doubled, from $9,000 to $18,000. Thus relative inequality is unchanged, but absolute inequality has risen.
While relative inequality has been the preferred concept in empirical work in development economics, perceptions that inequality is rising may well be based on absolute disparities in living standards. That is one interpretation of what people mean when they talk about the "gap between the rich and the poor" and the "widening economic divide."
49 Observers such as citizens and NGOs working in developing countries can easily see the increasing absolute gap in living standards between selected poor people (possibly those an NGO works with) and selected "rich" people. The fact that the proportionate gap may well be unchanged is less evident to the naked eye, if only because this requires knowledge of the overall mean. Furthermore, there is little obvious reason for assuming that it is the relative inequalities in incomes (rather than absolute inequalities) that matter instrumentally to valued social outcomes. Arguably inequalities in power relate more to absolute rather than relative inequality in income.
Here again, the value judgments made about what "inequality" means have considerable bearing on the position one takes in the globalization debate. Finding that the share of income going to the poor does not change on average with growth does not mean that "growth raises the incomes (of the poor) by about as much as it raises the incomes of everybody else." 50 Given existing inequality, the income gains to the rich from distribution-neutral growth will of course be greater than the gains to the poor. In the above example of two households, the income gain from growth is ten times greater for the high-income household. To say that this means that the poor "share fully" in the gains from growth is clearly a stretch. And the example is not far fetched. For the richest decile in India, the income gain from distribution-neutral growth will be about four times higher than the gain to the poorest quintile; it will be fifteen to twenty times higher in Brazil or South Africa.
The common empirical finding in the literature that changes in relative inequality have virtually zero correlation with rates of economic growth naturally carries little weight for those who are concerned instead about absolute inequality. In figure 4 the relative inequality index used in figure 1 has been replaced by an absolute Gini index, based on absolute differences in incomes (not normalized by the mean). In marked contrast to figure 1, a strong positive correlation emerges (a correlation coefficient of .64). The absolute gap between the rich and the poor tends to rise in growing economies and fall in contracting ones.
If one is a relativist, then one might conclude from figure 1 that there is no aggregate trade-off between economic growth and reducing inequality, though it should be noted that this is only true on average; there may well be a trade-off in specific country circumstances. If one is an absolutist, then an aggregate tradeoff is implied by figure 4: in a typical developing country, someone who values lower absolute inequality must be willing to have less growth and higher absolute poverty.
The distinction between absolute and relative inequality also affects assessments of the prospects for reducing poverty through economic growth. Naturally, Change in log mean (annualized) what happens to inequality during the growth process is relevant to its impact on poverty. A widely used benchmark for quantifying the impact of future growth on poverty is to assume that relative inequality does not change. For example, Chen and Ravallion find that for the developing world as a whole in 2001, the poverty gap index (for the "$1 per day" poverty line at 1993 purchasing power parity) has an elasticity with respect to the mean of -2.5 when relative inequality is held constant. 51 If all income levels grow at the same rate, then the aggregate poverty gap index will fall at a rate of 5 percent a year for a growth rate of 2 percent a year in mean household income per capita. However, what if constant absolute inequality is used as the distributional benchmark? When the ChenRavallion calculations are repeated holding absolute inequality constant instead, the elasticity rises sharply to -12. So instead of the poverty gap falling at a rate of 5 percent a year for a growth rate of 2 percent a year, the same growth rate keeping absolute inequality constant would see the poverty gap falling at a remarkable 24 percent a year. Of course, all such calculations are fanciful unless it can be established how one could achieve such a growth process in reality. However, these simple calculations serve to illustrate how sensitive our assessments of the impact on poverty of distribution-neutral growth can be to the concept of inequality used in defining what "distribution-neutral" means.
Economists specializing on income distribution are well aware of the distinction between absolute and relative inequality, though it is hardly ever mentioned in empirical work on growth and distribution. 52 Contributions to the globalization debate, in both popular and academic forums, have rarely been explicit about which concept is being used. Indeed, critics of globalization are often vague about what they mean by inequality, though what they have in mind appears to be closer to absolute inequality than relative inequality. Defenders of globalization invariably point to evidence on relative inequality without mentioning that it is not the only possible concept of inequality and that the results obtained, and their interpretation for country policy, are significantly affected by this choice.
Yet the evaluative judgments made about the distributional changes associated with globalization may depend crucially on whether one thinks about inequality in absolute or relative terms. There is no economic theory that tells us that inequality is relative, not absolute. It is not that one concept is right and the other wrong. Nor are they two ways of measuring the same thing. Rather, they are two different concepts. The revealed preferences for one concept over another reflect implicit value judgment about what constitutes a fair division of the gains from growth. Those judgments need to be brought into the open and given critical scrutiny before one can take a well-considered position in this debate.
Conclusions
Both sides of the globalization debate often use the term "inequality" as though we all agree on exactly what that means. But we almost certainly do not all agree-and that could well be the nub of the matter. This paper has demonstrated that the factual claims one hears about what is happening to inequality in the world depend critically on value judgments embedded in standard measurement practices. Three such issues have been highlighted: whether one weights people equally or countries equally when assessing what is happening to global inequality, what weight one attaches to horizontal inequalities, and whether one focuses on relative inequality or absolute inequality in assessing the welfare impacts of globalization.
Forming defensible value judgments on each of these issues is hardly straightforward, and this discussion has illustrated that arguments can be made both ways. Readers should form their own judgments as to what side they take on each of these issues. But this discussion points to some tentative conclusions. On the first issue, while it is simplistic to say that it is a purely technical "mistake" to not weight by population sizes, it can be agreed that there is something troubling about comparing inequality among countries while ignoring the (huge) differences in the size of their populations-thus giving higher weight to people living in smaller countries. Whether population weights are the right approach is still unclear, given that country identity can matter to welfare. Neither weighing method is ideal, but weighting countries equally would seem hard to defend when making judgments about inequality.
On the second issue, while knowing what is happening to aggregate inequality and poverty is clearly of first-order importance, horizontal inequalities need to get more attention than they typically do in assessments of the welfare impacts of policy reforms. Conventional inequality measures may well undervalue horizontal inequality. In this respect, the globalization debate takes on the character of two ships passing in the dark of night: one side says that inequality has been unchanged in the aggregate and (hence) that poverty has fallen; the other side points to the losers among the poor. Arguably both are right.
On the third issue, both sides of the globalization debate need to be clearer about whether one is talking about absolute or relative inequality and to recognize that the other side may not share their concept. Relative inequality has been the more prominent concept in applied work by economists, though arguably it is absolute inequality that many people see in their daily lives and that motivates their concerns about distributive justice. Greater attention to absolute inequality would help inform important debates about development, including globalization. However, the trade-offs with other valued goals, including fighting absolute poverty, need to be confronted explicitly.
Both academic and popular contributions to the globalization debate have rarely acknowledged the differences in values that underlie the seemingly conflicting evidence on what has been happening to inequality and poverty. Most readers of the popular press and the web sites reporting on this topic do not see the embedded value judgments in the "facts" presented to them. It seems unlikely that most protagonists in this debate are deliberately duping the public; indeed, there appears to be some common ground of values, such as in the shared concern about absolute poverty. Hopefully, then, the debate can move on to address more directly the competing concepts of inequality that lie at the heart of the matter.
Comments and Discussion
Erik Thorbecke: Over the years I have enjoyed reading Martin Ravallion's papers, and this one is no exception. It highlights some fundamental issues inherent to the concept of income inequality in a transparent way and provides a convincing explanation of the conflict between the two sides of the globalization debate. Since I agree pretty much with the content of the author's paper, I propose to raise a few issues extending his analysis. I have four comments: the first two are relatively minor points whereas the last two are substantive and go to the heart of measuring income inequality.
First, Ravallion correctly points out that "churning," that is, two individuals swapping places in the income distribution so that one person gains and another loses, would not be seen to have any impact on the inequality measure whatsoever. Yet he remarks that "one should not be surprised if the losers in the process are unhappy about the outcome and that this fuels criticisms of the policies that led to it." But the issue is deeper: any churning, assuming a convex utility function (reflecting declining marginal utility of income), will lead to a net reduction of utility. The loss of utility to the loser will be greater than the gain in utility to the gainer. Hence if enough churning takes place, it could be potentially destabilizing from a societal standpoint.
A second minor comment is that class conflicts could result from vertical inequality. For example, a structural adjustment and trade liberalization program could lead to higher food prices in a developing country, benefiting farmers who are net sellers of food, while agricultural workers (the landless) would be negatively affected by the reform. Now I come to my more substantive comments. Ravallion is concerned about the robustness of population-weighted inequality series and the need for statistical caution in inferring that inequality is falling when weighting people equally. I believe that this is a crucial issue that needs to be extended not just to the underlying data but also to the implicit and explicit assumptions and methodologies used in deriving world inequality measures. The fundamental question that needs to be asked is, how sensitive is the Gini coefficient (or any other inequality measure) to measurement errors and assumptions used in deriving it? Instead of reporting one unique scalar value for the Gini coefficient, could one derive a range of values depending on Bayesian and non-Bayesian estimates of the likely effects of measurement errors and underlying methodologies used to derive the worldwide income distribution? One advantage of this procedure would be that it would force the analyst to identify and confront the key assumptions and measurement errors to which the Gini coefficient is sensitive.
Let me illustrate with the help of some examples. In his derivation of the change in inequality in the worldwide income distribution, Sala-i-Martin made a number of assumptions.
1 For example, he left out the former Soviet Republics, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia-countries that all underwent large increases in inequality in the 1990s. He also derived within-country distributions from quintile distributions, assuming zero variance within quintiles. This use of sparse and fragmentary data led Milanovic, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, to claim that "never was so much calculated with so little." 2 The question I am raising is how far can one go in estimating the likely effects of such assumptions on the real Gini? It should certainly be possible to infer how much the Gini coefficient would be underestimated by ignoring the intraquintile variance (using six points of an income distribution rather than the whole distribution).
When it comes to measurement errors, we can distinguish between sampling errors-to the extent that much of the information comes from household surveys-and nonsampling errors. The latter clearly dwarf the former. One example given in Ravallion's paper is the systematic bias in computing growth rates for China: the long-term annual per capita growth rate is likely to have been overestimated by 1 to 2 percent. This kind of overestimation for a country constituting almost a sixth of the global population-particularly if various segments of the Chinese income pyramid were affected differentially-is bound to have a significant impact on the magnitude of the inequality measure. Obviously, expert judgment would be required in order to estimate a lower bound and an upper bound for the Gini coefficient. To repeat, the process of computing such a (confidence) interval would have the great advantage of pinpointing critical data, procedures, and assumptions to which the magnitude of the Gini coefficient is sensitive and would thereby lead to more robust estimates.
My final question is whether income is an appropriate measure of welfare. Typically, the income distribution is approximated from the total consumption (total expenditures plus the imputed value of home consumption) of households as reported by household surveys. This is an incomplete measure of money-metric welfare because it ignores the imputed value of the benefit received by households from public services (in particular, education and health services) and public goods. Might it not be better to use outcome variables, such as health and educational status, instead of or in conjunction with income to measure welfare? Income is relatively unbounded upwardly. Much of the income inequality is driven by right-hand tails of national distributions. One example suffices to illustrate this point: the richest 10 percent of the U.S. population has an aggregate income equal to that of the poorest 43 percent of the people of the world, or alternatively, the total income of the richest 25 million Americans is equal to the total income of almost 2 billion people.
3 Measures of inequality are quite sensitive to these high incomes.
On the other hand, health and educational status are more bounded, as would be the case, for instance, if life expectancy were taken as the measure of health status. In any population the life expectancy of the oldest individual is rarely more than 50 percent above the average life expectancy. Worldwide inequality would be significantly lower if measured in terms of health or educational status than in terms of income and might reflect more accurately the actual welfare (happiness) enjoyed by different individuals in different settings. Of course, aside from the difficulty of obtaining reliable information on health status, there is the additional problem of the quality of health and quality of life for individuals who enjoy the same life expectancy. Does a Sri Lankan woman with the same health status as an American woman enjoy the same level of welfare? Making allowance for different levels of quality of life is most difficult and might only be assessed through subjective surveys. What appears clear, however, is that a Sri Lankan with the same life expectancy as an American and receiving an income one-tenth that of her middle-class American counterpart-which in her society might place her in the top income quintile-would, in all likelihood, enjoy a welfare level almost certainly greater than one-tenth that of her counterpart and perhaps even comparable. Welfare and happiness depend not just on material welfare but also on the various types of capital available to individuals, such as social capital and health capital. It is important to remind ourselves that income is a very inadequate measure of welfare-although at the present time we have to rely on it, faute de mieux.
Lant Pritchett:
One of the difficulties of commenting on the work of Martin Ravallion is that he very rarely, if ever, makes mistakes. I know this from having had many, many debates with him, none of which I can claim to have won in his judgment, and actually few of which I can claim to have won by even my own judgment. As the title of the conference is "Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality" and the author talked mostly about inequality, I will discuss globalization and poverty. In that way I will not have to go head-to-head with anything he said about inequality.
I would like to make two points. First, current globalization talk is-and is almost bound to be-nonsense, for reasons that I will go into shortly. Second, I would argue that most economists should not buy into the commonly accepted low poverty lines as a basis for social objectives that economic policy should address.
First, regarding "globalization," we economists keep talking about it as if it was the central driving phenomenon of the period in which we live when, in fact, I would argue that the central driving phenomenon of the last century and even of the last fifty years is nearly the opposite: the division of the global economy into smaller and smaller units. These shrinking, proliferating units limit the mobility of persons, which is the key factor that matters most for inequality.
So while we argue whether "globalization" is good or bad for the poor or good or bad for inequality, we should be discussing whether the recent set of processes called X has this or that effect. Before naming X, we should determine what its central features are. I would argue that there have been four central processes over the last fifty years. First, there has been the proliferation of sovereigns.
1 This means that there are more borders, more legal jurisdictions and independent judiciaries, more monies, more flags, and more representatives in the United Nations. Second, technological innovations have caused the transport costs of many things, including information, money, and goods, to decline. Third, there is a set of processes in which some of the many nation-states pursue policies that are modestly more liberal regarding the movement of some items of economic relevance across the increasing numbers of national borders. Fourth, the movement of labor is, in general, completely excluded from liberalization policies.
There are two key points. First, I would argue that there is no particularly strong reason to call this set of four processes "globalization." Suppose that in 2004 the state of Idaho seceded from the United States and set up as a new sovereign entity with an army, borders, and a currency; disallowed all movement of persons from all other countries, including the United States; and imposed a tariff of 10 percent on all goods from the rest of the United States. Then suppose ten years later in 2014 Idaho lowers its tariff on USLI (that is, United State less Idaho) products to 3 percent. Wouldn't we think it odd if the literature on the impact of that policy change referred to the study of the process of integration when disintegration was the central phenomenon?
The second point is that whatever we call the process X, economists should have no strong preconceptions about the answer to that particular question about how X should have affected inequality. Let me quickly review some facts in support of such cautiousness.
First, the number of sovereigns in the world has increased. It has gone from something like 50 before World War II to approximately 200 today, and these sort of sovereign entities control borders and hence inhibit economic transactions across geographic space. This is an enormous antiglobalizing trend, and it has divided up the world economic base into smaller and smaller, not larger and larger, units. And even with something approaching full liberalization, there are studies that suggest that border effects per se are large even across highly liberalized environments. For instance, trade between the United States and Canada appears to be substantially lower because of a border, in spite of the fact that one can hardly imagine more trade liberalization between two countries in the absence of true integration.
One thing that has happened over the historical scale is that only around 10 percent of the total global inequality was cross-country variation in 1820-that is, economically, it was about the same to be a peasant in England as it was to be one in India. Today, something like 60 percent of the total global inequality across individuals is accounted for by differences in average income across countries. So for some reason, this process called X has been associated with a huge increase in the amount of inequality that is accounted for by differences across the borders of nation states.
The second thing is that the current era of X inhibits the mobility of persons across national boundaries. These barriers are huge, in that they prevent large amounts of movement. The differentials in the real, purchasing-power-adjusted wages of unskilled labor between the United States and countries that sent substantial fractions of their population to the United States around the turn of the century were between two-to-one and four-to-one. That is, the wage differentials that drove people out of Ireland, Italy, or Norway into Minnesota or New York were substantial but not astronomic.
The current wage differentials between potential sending and receiving countries are enormously higher-from six-to-one to ten-to-one. 2 Substantially higher wage differentials accompanied by substantially lower migration flows (as pro-portions of both sending and receiving country populations) suggest that the obvious is true: the guys with guns guarding the borders are a binding constraint on labor mobility.
Such barriers to labor mobility have implications for the dynamics of population and real wages. If the economic process generates large region-specific shocks to the desired population in a geographic region (say, as a result of changes in technology or agriculture, economies of scale, or urbanization), those shocks must be accommodated. If there is labor mobility, negative shocks are accommodated by people moving out of Kansas and into California. If there is no labor mobility, those geographic shocks are accommodated by people becoming poor but being trapped in their region, while those for whom the shock is positive get rich. When a region experiences a negative shock and people move out, it creates a ghost region, but when there are barriers to the mobility of labor, it produces zombies-and as everyone knows, a zombie is the living dead. A zombie is a country in which the real wage wants to go down dramatically because of a negative shock to the desired population, but the population cannot get out. So the only way to accommodate that shock is a huge fall in the real wage.
Comparing data on GDP per capita and population from regions within countries to data across countries leads to striking results. Within countries (particularly large countries), there are large differences in the growth of population with small differences in the growth of income per head. Across countries the opposite is true: there is enormous disparity in the growth rate of income per head and very little disparity in the growth rate of population less the rate of natural increase.
Thus I would argue that one of the things we have learned from the processes called X is that the world is not, in fact, globalized. The key market that is not globalized is the market for labor, and when one does not, in fact, have a liberal market for labor, one cannot, in theory, predict with any accuracy using existing models how other policies and the liberalizing of other markets will or will not affect inequality.
I close this discussion of what is not globalization with a question about why figure 1 is facetious. Figure 1 compares the welfare gains from removing restrictions on labor mobility, which estimates suggest would double world GDP, with the gains to be had from everything that is on the World Trade Organization agenda for the current round. Notice that the changes that are the focus of discussion in the literature generate welfare gains that are not even detectable compared to the huge gain that supposedly would be produced by full liberalization of labor markets. But, of course, this graph is facetious because, for some reason, we simply do not want to talk about liberalizing or globalization in the only market where it really matters: labor. Now I will expand on my second point. The question often asked is, "Do the processes called X affect poverty?" Well, that requires a definition of poverty. Nearly all of the poverty numbers in the public domain are the Foster-GreerThorbecke (FGT) measures of poverty. When the World Bank, via Martin Ravallion, reports on the number of the poor, it is based on such a calculation. And these numbers all depend on there being a poverty line.
The thing about a poverty line is that income gains above it count zero toward the reduction of poverty. This is not about how much being below the poverty line counts. With the "poverty intensity" parameter of the FGT measures you can vary poverty intensity in a variety of semiplausible ways. But if you state that "poverty Gains as percent of world GDP reduction is my objective," and you set a poverty line, every gain to income above that line counts for zero in your objective function. Hence before we can ask, "How does X affect poverty?" we must draw a poverty line. It would seem that a reasonable poverty line, particularly an upper bound on poverty lines for global analysis, should be set where the analyst is comfortable that zero is a reasonable approximation to his or her true social welfare function.
A huge problem with nearly all of the literature to date is that it has bought into a monopoly of very low poverty lines for global absolute poverty-a monopoly of the "dollar a day" or "two dollars a day" poverty lines. But it is simply ludicrous, in my view, to set those as upper bound poverty lines. Zero is not a reasonable approximation to the appropriate weight in the social welfare function of any reasonable policymaker at a poverty line drawn through a dollar a day or two dollars a day, for the following three reasons.
First, people do not regard gains to their income as being anywhere near zero at two dollars a day, and I am a big believer that the social welfare function should be nonpaternalistic. In fact, if you examine the relationship between subjective well-being and income across nations from the World Values Survey, it is very difficult to argue that this flattens out at anything like two dollars a day.
3 It might flatten out at $20,000 a year, but it does not flatten out at $730 a year.
Second, "the rich" of poor countries have enormously lower incomes than "the poor" of rich countries. Dani Rodrik has calculated whether the "rich" (defined as the top 10 percent) in the bottom 10 percent of countries have higher income than the "poor" (defined as the bottom 10 percent) in a rich country. By his calculation, the purchasing power parity (PPP) income of a rich individual in a poor country is P$2,800-only P$7 a day-while the income of a poor individual in a rich country is three times higher, at P$8,640 or P$23 a day. If the bottom 10 percent of the rich-country population is poor, then so is the top 10 percent in poor countries. If you suspect PPP adjustments, I suspect you are wrong: the poor of rich countries are better off than the top quintile in nearly every poor country by every non-money-metric indicator of well-being-food share, child mortality, malnutrition, and schooling. In India, Nepal, and Nigeria, the malnutrition rate is 30 percent among the top 20 percent of households (as measured by the asset index). 4 It is ludicrous to think that "we" do not care about the impact of globalization on "the rich" in India when, in fact, 30 percent of the people who are rich have children who are malnourished. If the poor of rich countries are poor, then so are people in the upper tails of the income distribu-tion of poor countries. And even if you do not care about income and only think money should be instrumental toward some warm and cuddly goal such as schooling, there is still no reason to cut off poverty at a low line such as two dollars a day, since the increments of income to well-being at those low levels are still very high.
I think the word poverty should always have an adjective that makes it clear what the relevant standard is. The dollar-a-day standard should define "destitute poverty" while the two-dollars-a-day line should define "extreme poverty," and a poverty line of ten dollars a day (in 1993 PPP dollars) should define "global poverty." Then when we discuss things like what is the impact of processes called X (not globalization) on poverty, there is neither an unwarranted monopoly of a single standard nor confusion. After all, the dollar-a-day standard is sharply penurious-only 7 percent of people in Sri Lanka are "destitute poor." While it might be one interesting question about whether globalization benefits the destitute poor, certainly that is not the only question of interest. We might conceivably have non-zero concern for people in the tenth percentile in Sri Lanka, who are excluded from consideration under the dollar-a-day standard. Thus we can also ask, "Does process X that some call globalization benefit the tendollar-a-day poor?" If some policy changes produce large gains in aggregate incomes in India, and the gain is slightly larger for the thirty-fifth percentilewho by any reasonable global standard are very poor people-than for the fifteenth, this scenario would not be considered a case of "globalizing policy reform that did not benefit 'the poor.'" What I am pleading for here is a bit more focus on economics, on how identifiable policy changes affect the distribution of income (both central tendency and dispersion), using validated theories and empirical evidence, and a bit less attention to questions in which one badly defined concept is related to another badly defined concept as, for instance, in the question, "Is globalization good or bad for poverty?" Discussion: Roger Betancourt noted that the reason that one side of the debate was interested in absolute inequality and the other was interested in relative inequality is that the essential differences are in measures of economic power that can affect policy outcomes. Unless the discussion focuses on measures of economic power, arguments will center on the interpretation of axioms rather than on real problems. Betancourt felt that the most important question was the impact of particular measures on the poor.
Bill Easterly challenged Ravallion's focus on the heterogeneity of the effect of shocks, such as in the case of changes in trade policy and the large numbers of losers. The problem with this focus is that it can apply to almost any change in economic policy or, for that matter, technology. In the United States, every week hundreds of thousands of jobs (approximately) are destroyed and hundreds of thousands are created. Although the losers complain loudly, no one believes that we should stop technological change and use typewriters rather than computers. He felt that the focus on the heterogeneity of winners and losers is misguided unless the losers are concentrated politically and can contest changes. Yet in terms of overall welfare, almost any economic change has winners and losers. Ravallion responded that this missed his point-that there is no foundation for the way conventional measures weight the horizontal components of inequality.
Carol Graham noted that Ravallion's discussion of losers echoed the earlier discussion about the need to do better at anticipating losses and providing losers with better protection. She then asked if the answer to the question whether absolute or relative inequality mattered more would be different if there was better protection for those who fell behind.
Related to this, Susan Collins referenced a paper by Rodrik and Fernandez as very relevant to the points raised by Ravallion.
1 That paper finds that the support for trade reform in a particular country is more likely to be influenced by the share of the relevant population that perceives it is at risk of losing than by whether the actual benefits of the reform outweighed the costs.
Branko Milanovic commented that Ravallion's paper brought out the ambiguities and difficulties associated with the entire debate. These include not only the difference between relative and absolute inequality but also the difference between horizontal and vertical inequality. He noted that unweighted inequality between countries (Concept 1 inequality) has been rising over the last twenty or so years. Intercountry inequality is, of course, less important than inequality between individuals, but it is not irrelevant. Not only does it represent a de facto test of the income convergence hypothesis-a fact that is quite well known-but there are additional elements that may underscore widening intercountry disparities. One is stimulus to migration that comes with increasing differences in mean country incomes. Another is the realization that each country is not just a random assortment of individuals but is effectively a culture. That means that one cannot easily say that inequality between countries does not matter at all. One cannot say that Chad is so hopeless that everyone should move out. If there is a culture, then there is probably some value to that culture per se. Thus a hopeless falling behind of such countries represents, in a social Darwinian world, a destruction of that culture. The importance of Concept 1 inequality can also be seen when applied to inequality between regions within a single country. If one notes that inequality between states in the United States is much lower than among the provinces in China, and is decreasing within the United States while it is increasing in China, then it reveals something very important about the way that labor and capital markets work in the United States versus in China.
Milanovic also noted that there are various sources of data driving the debate on global inequality and the important role of China therein. Maddison's data, for example, suggest that China's growth is still high, but instead of 9 percent per year over the period of last twenty years, it is closer to 5.5 percent on average. That changes the story for global inequality, first because global inequality around 1978-80 is lower than if official Chinese numbers are used and then because its decline is also smaller. Finally, Milanovic noted that in a paper he wrote about Yugoslavia more than twenty years ago, he found that really poor republics did not mind becoming poorer as long as others who were richer were also becoming poorer. He called this a Verkhovensky improvement. Verkhovensky, a hero from Dostoyevsky's The Possessed, was a radical leveler. People, or countries, might like to be more equal even if that is not got going to make them better off in an absolute sense.
Abhijit Banerjee highlighted the determining role in the debate of the way in which India and China are weighted. If you believe that India and China are driving all the results, then there is really nothing else in the global poverty numbers. He then noted that the whole point of having a good theory of inequality was to be able target those who are likely to get hurt, for example, by trade or innovation.
Sylvia Ostry compared views about inequality in the United States and Europe using Hirschman's concepts of exit and voice, and suggested that there were advantages to the American focus on exit.
3 The concepts of voice and exit reflect the complex, systemic relationship of institutions and how they differ across countries.
A number of speakers also commented on the Pritchett discussion. Bill Easterly noted that the proliferation of sovereigns was a very clever point about globalization but one that needed qualifying. This is because even in the areas where sovereigns are proliferating, such as the former Soviet Union, there is no true free trade or factor mobility. In a similar vein, Susan Collins reiterated Pritchett's point about the many dimensions in which the world is more global. At the same time, there are many dimensions in which we are far from total globalization. The discussion often focuses too much on extremes, while reality is much closer to the middle and, in some places, to a scenario of small nation-states with very little interaction.
Carol Graham commented on Pritchett's point about the top 20 percent of people in Brazil having worse health indicators than the poorest people in the United States. She made the point that in this instance, the discussion is really about differences in social insurance, public health, and other public policies and not about income poverty. Finally, Ravallion took issue with Pritchett's suggestion to focus on $15 a day as a poverty number, which he thought would be worse than the current focus on $1 a day. He also noted that the World Bank had initially avoided highlighting a single indicator, publishing instead a range of numbers to show the distribution. But people very quickly focused on a single line with a headcount index, and he believes they will continue to do so.
